韦氏观察

一位意大利检察官透露：黑手党通过电视转播的足球赛向身陷囹圄的大佬们源源不断地传送消息。转播球赛时，屏幕下方一般会显示球迷发的短信。黑手党籍此向狱中“享受”最高防卫待遇的同伙发送加密信息，电视台却完全被蒙在鼓里。
An Italian prosecutor has revealed that the Mafia has been sending information to its jailed bosses through a television football show. The show runs fans’ text messages along the bottom of the screen. Unknown to its producers, mobsters used this facility to send coded messages to their associates serving maximum-security sentences.

谈到这些信息看起来是多么寻常时，检控官举了其中一条很简单的短信：“保罗，一切正常。”若想不惹人怀疑，就只能说些很平常的话。但是，正如牛津大学的社会学教授迭戈•甘伯塔（Diego Gambetta）在其书中所说的：这些很平常的秘语极难破译。该书写得曲折动人，引人入胜。
The prosecutor remarked on how ordinary the messages seemed. One read, simply: “Everything’s OK, Paulo.” If they were not to attract suspicion, they could not be anything else. But the apparently banal secret message is desperately difficult to get right, as an intriguing book by Diego Gambetta, an Oxford University sociology professor, makes plain.

破译密语时会有诸多风险：消息接收者可能会错误理解，其他人（比如警方）也可能已成功破译。做生意时沟通不畅合同会泡汤，然而对于罪犯来说，信息一旦发错就可能意味着要蹲大牢，甚至是更糟的结果。
There are many dangers: that the recipient of the message might misunderstand it, or that others, such as the police, might understand it all too well. And whereas a failure of communication in the business world can result in a loss of a contract, for criminals, sending the wrong message could mean years in prison, or worse.

在《黑道帮规：揭秘罪犯沟通之道》(Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate)一书中，甘伯塔教授指出：黑道中人的沟通方式给犯罪以外的领域提供了启发。他们的沟通之道是个“非凡案例，揭下了文明的道德观念与制度的面纱，让我们清晰地看到了最原始状态下的人际交往”。

甘伯塔教授写道：为了使自己处于有利地位，罪犯会不择手段，但又拿不准谁可信赖，他们形象地代表了最典型的“经济人”（homo economicus，一切行为都是为了最大限度地满足自己的利益，工作是为了获得经济报酬——译者注）。

罪犯之间的沟通联络与合法做生意之间有多大可比性？有些方面两者风马牛不相及，尤其在挑选同伙时的利弊权衡。从事合法生意时，挑选合资方或供应商时会有风险。但你可以四处打听；一家公司的声誉如何，是众所周知的。如果供应商或者合资方爽约，企业通常可以诉诸法律解决。

当然，罪犯无法这么做。要搞清楚谁可信不太容易。干坏事的人如何能知道一位潜在伙伴会不会是警方的卧底？正如公司老板看重顶级商学院的MBA学历一样，罪犯们在意的是所谓资格——还有什么犯罪凭据胜过真正蹲过大狱？甘伯塔教授说，这就是为什么说监狱是犯罪学校的缘由。这并非仅仅说罪犯在此可以学到新的犯罪伎俩，或者说甚至可能在此结交以后的同伙。监狱提供了对方曾经为恶的凭据。

但是，知道对方犯过罪并不意味着他们就可信赖。甘伯塔教授引述的研究成果表明：荷兰毒贩经常互相出卖对方。“盗亦有道” (Honour among thieves)基本是一句空话。罪犯通过付诸于暴力（或者是威胁使用暴力）来执行他们的“契约”。

读了甘伯塔教授的著述，可以了解中规中矩做生意是怎么一回事。就拿品牌保护来说，公司雇用律师来保护自己的品牌。罪犯不受法律保护，干起事来更为直截了当。甘伯塔教授讲述了这样一个案例：洛杉矶的一群孩子自我感觉穿着“黑帮”风格的衣服比较酷。“他们瞎溜达，转悠到了‘不该去’的地方，结果一伙真正的匪徒就朝他们开枪……开枪者是在维护在自家地盘上穿着这种衣服的权利。”

罪犯们锒铛入狱之后，他们之间的沟通术对企业来说最具启发意义。囚犯无权选择室友。正如甘伯塔教授所说的：“选择与谁住一起不由囚犯自己掌控。”教授没太阐述两者之间的关联，我的脑海中却浮现出办公室里的众生相。

犯人们在牢中争夺稀缺资源（如香烟、使用电话或者静处）时，必须要摸清楚其他犯人的脾性。办公室里上班族行事方式如出一辙：想方设法争占靠窗的办公桌、抢一份美差、或者是争宠于上司。为此，员工们使出了形形色色的招数——下班后频繁的交际，拍老板马屁或者是收集大量信息。犯人们惯用的“法宝”则是——暴力。

例外的情况是：与我们常人一样，犯人也不喜欢真打斗。比起真正诉诸暴力，坐拥暴虐之名方是上上策。问题是得先实打实地干几场架才能真正威慑住其他犯人。因此，服刑期短的囚犯相比刑期长的囚犯、候审犯人相比已宣判者更经常以暴力解决问题。新入狱者想要树威；而老资格的囚犯早已扬名立威。如果不断有新的囚犯转来，牢房内的等级制度得靠不断打斗才能得以重建。

新来的囚犯会打乱原有秩序；已经确立关系的囚犯之间更可能相安无事。这就是企业界可以从这里学到的一课。

In Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate, Prof Gambetta argues that underworld communications provide lessons extending beyond crime. They are “a remarkable test case that allows us to see human interactions at their rawest, to lift the veil that civilising mores and institutions spread over our lives”.

Criminals, desperate to win some advantage, but unsure whom to trust, embody homo economicus at his most basic, Prof Gambetta says.

How close is criminal communication to that of legitimate business? There are areas where they diverge, not least in how calculating one has to be in choosing associates. There are risks in selecting joint venture partners or suppliers for legitimate business. But you can ask around; companies’ reputations become well-known. And if a supplier or joint venture partner reneges on an agreement, the business can always turn to the law.

Criminals cannot do that, of course. It is hard to know whom to trust. How does a villain know a potential partner is not an undercover policeman? Just like employers value MBAs from top business schools, criminals look for credentials – and there is no better proof of true criminality than having been in prison. This, Prof Gambetta says, is why prisons are such schools of crime. It is not just that criminals learn new techniques, or even that they meet potential future partners. Prison provides proof of badness.

Knowing that someone else is a criminal does not, however, mean they can be trusted. Prof Gambetta cites research showing that Dutch drug dealers constantly double-cross one another. “Honour among thieves” is largely a myth. Criminals rely on violence to enforce their contracts, or on the threat of it.

Reading Prof Gambetta’s account brings home just how civilised business under the law actually is. Take the protection of brands. Companies use their lawyers to defend their brands. Lacking the protection of the law, criminals’ enforcement is more direct. Prof Gambetta recounts the case of a group of Los Angeles kids who thought it cool to wear “gangsta” outfits. “They eventually strayed into the ‘wrong’ district, and a group of real gangstas shot them … The shooters were protecting their ‘property rights’ over the use of the outfit in their territory.”

It is when the criminals end up in jail that they provide business with most food for thought. Prisoners cannot choose who their fellow inmates are. As Prof Gambetta says: “Sorting and mixing is not under the prisoners’ control.” He does not quite make the connection, but it reminds me of the average office.

“a remarkable test case that allows us to see human interactions at their rawest, to lift the veil that civilising mores and institutions spread over our lives”.

Criminals, desperate to win some advantage, but unsure whom to trust, embody homo economicus at his most basic, Prof Gambetta says.

How close is criminal communication to that of legitimate business? There are areas where they diverge, not least in how calculating one has to be in choosing associates. There are risks in selecting joint venture partners or suppliers for legitimate business. But you can ask around; companies’ reputations become well-known. And if a supplier or joint venture partner reneges on an agreement, the business can always turn to the law.

Criminals cannot do that, of course. It is hard to know whom to trust. How does a villain know a potential partner is not an undercover policeman? Just like employers value MBAs from top business schools, criminals look for credentials – and there is no better proof of true criminality than having been in prison. This, Prof Gambetta says, is why prisons are such schools of crime. It is not just that criminals learn new techniques, or even that they meet potential future partners. Prison provides proof of badness.

Knowing that someone else is a criminal does not, however, mean they can be trusted. Prof Gambetta cites research showing that Dutch drug dealers constantly double-cross one another. “Honour among thieves” is largely a myth. Criminals rely on violence to enforce their contracts, or on the threat of it.

Reading Prof Gambetta’s account brings home just how civilised business under the law actually is. Take the protection of brands. Companies use their lawyers to defend their brands. Lacking the protection of the law, criminals’ enforcement is more direct. Prof Gambetta recounts the case of a group of Los Angeles kids who thought it cool to wear “gangsta” outfits. “They eventually strayed into the ‘wrong’ district, and a group of real gangstas shot them … The shooters were protecting their ‘property rights’ over the use of the outfit in their territory.”

It is when the criminals end up in jail that they provide business with most food for thought. Prisoners cannot choose who their fellow inmates are. As Prof Gambetta says: “Sorting and mixing is not under the prisoners’ control.” He does not quite make the connection, but it reminds me of the average office.

By FT / Michael Skapinker 译者:常和